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Section One 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Both the Environment Act 1986 and the Conservation Act 1987 contain explicit as 
well as implicit references to "values" in the context of natural resource management. 
In the Environment Act 1986 for example, the Ministry for the Environment is 
charged with the responsibility of ensuring that " ... in the management of natural and 
physical resources, full and balanced account is taken of (inter alia): 
(a) the intrinsic values of ecosystems; and 
(b) . all values which are placed by individuals and groups on the quality of the 
environment" (Environment Act, 1986). 
Such explicit references to "values" were generally avoided in earlier resource 
management legislation. In the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 for example, 
the difficult area of juggling different demands for water was dealt with by requiring 
that the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority which was established 
under the Act " ... co-ordinate all matters relating to natural waters so as to ensure 
that this national asset is available to meet as many demands as possible and is used 
to the best advantage of both the country and the region in which it exists in the 
course of nature"-(Water and Soil Conservation Act, 1967). 
Such clauses provide decision makers with only very broad guidelines upon which 
they can base their judgements about resource allocation. These broad guidelines 
are refined and more specifically interpreted over time through the development of· 
case law by the Courts and Planning Tribunals as a result of resource allocation 
conflicts, thus placing considerable responsibilities in the area of policy development 
on the jUdiciary. 
However, the terms "value" and "values" as used in the Environment Act need to be 
interpreted too, since the Act does not provide a concise definition of what is meant 
by "value". If the Ministry is to develop policies that fulfil these explicit require-
ments, it is necessary to first focus attention on the meaning of any reference to 
"value" within the Act, because although the terms "value(s)" and "valuing" have a 
general, everyday meaning, they may acquire quite different, and very specific 
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meanings in a philosophical, socio-cultural or economic context. For example, the term 
"intrinsic value" may refer to a property of an object that is independent of a human 
evaluator, but it can also mean a special type of worth that is assigned to an object by 
human beings. 
Secondly, methods for revealing values need to be explored. For example, which methods 
are available to inform decision makers about the values that Maori and Pakeha New 
Zealanders place on wetlands, recreational hunting, endangered species, air quality etc.? 
Finally, processes and institutional frameworks need to be developed that allow for the 
integration of this ''value information" with other physical, social, political and economic 
information so that the balance referred to in the Act can be achieved. 
The Ministry for the Environment has given recognition to the difficulty of explicitly 
incorporating values into policy development and the design of institutional frameworks 
by including "Values clarification" as a major theme within their Research Agenda 
1989-1992. Their stated research goals in this area are: 
(1) To clarify the interpretations of the term ''values'' and possible processes for 
meeting the related requirements stated in the Environment Act 1986 and any 
legislative outcomes of the Resource Management Law Reform. 
(2) To present the results of the research in an appropriate form for its 
application to policy development (Ministry for the Environment, 1989, p.35). 
The present publication, which was commissioned by the Ministry for the Environment 
during 1988, sets out to provide an initial, multidisciplinary clarification of the concept of 
''value'' as it is used in natural resource management, as a starting point for the Ministry'S 
research programme on values. The following criteria were used in determining which 
of the vast number of different concepts of ''value'' should be included in this publication: 
(a) whether the concept was currently used in a resource management context; or 
(b) whether it was judged to be sufficiently important, be it in terms of its 
influence on developments in the field, its popularity, or its implications for the 
Ministry's research programme on values; or 
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( c) whether empirical methods associated with the concept might be of use in the 
Ministry's research programme on values. 
This study is multidisciplinary in character in that it draws on a range of disciplinary 
concepts; however, no attempt is made to synthesise these concepts nor to 
recommend anyone particular concept above others. 
1.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this study are: 
( a) to describe, and provide clear distinctions between, the various concepts and 
related measures of "value" from the social sciences and humanities, as they 
are used in a resource management context; 
(b) to provide a typology of theories of value, for the purpose of guiding further 
analytical work; 
( c) to provide a selected bibliography on concepts of "value"; and 
(d) to raise some implications for the Ministry's research programme on values 
clarification. 
1.3 Structure 
Following this introduction, Section 2 contains a brief overview of the general usage 
of the terms "value(s)" and "valuation". 
In Sections 3, 4, and 5, particular theories, concepts and measures of "value" in 
philosophy, the social and behavioural sciences, and in economics are described, and 
selected bibliographies are included. 
Finally, the implications of the different concepts of "value" for the Ministry's 
research programme are discussed in Section 6. 
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Section Two 
The general usage of "value" 
The term value or values is used in a great variety of contexts and has many 
meanings in everyday language. Value can mean standards, beliefs, principles, moral 
obligations and social norms, but also desires, wants, needs or interests. 
Furthermore, value can also mean the worth, importance or significance of a thing or 
object of interest. This abundance of different meanings is not only found in 
ordinary speech, it is also evident in the usage of "value" in the social sciences and 
humanities. 
A clear distinction needs to be drawn between two general senses in which the term 
is used (see e.g. Brown, 1984; Williams, 1968): 
(a) the evaluation of some object or phenomenon; and 
(b) the standards, or criteria, in terms of which such an evaluation is made. 
Examples of the former are statements such as "this forest has a low commercial 
value", or "nuclear armament has a high deterrence value"; the emphasis lies on the 
object (the forest, nuclear arms) that is evaluated. 
The latter sense can be exemplified by statements such as nan exotic forest plantation 
has a higher commercial value than a similar area of native forest", or "nuclear 
armament is ethically unjustifiable"; here, the emphasis is on the standards 
(commercial value, ethics) in terms of which the object is evaluated. 
Thus, a clear conceptual distinction exists between an object that may have value, 
and the standards of evaluation (or value(s» that are held by a subject; object and 
subject are linked by a process of valuation (Fig. 2.1). 
Valuation 
OBJECT SUBJECT 
Figure 2.1: Valuation process. 
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In practice, the distinction between these two perspectives often becomes blurred, as 
the application of standards of evaluation immediately results in some object of 
interest having value; moreover, the value of an object may in turn serve as a 
standard of further evaluation. 
Throughout this publication, the following terms will be used (where necessary) to 
distinguish between these two general senses of "value": 
assigned value or object value (standing for the result of an evaluation of an 
object or phenomenon); 
value-as-criterion, or held value (referring to the standards in terms of which 
an evaluation is made). 
A simple but systematic classification of the multiple meanings of the term "value", 
distinguishing between the use of "value" as an abstract noun, as a concrete noun, and 
as a verb is provided by Frankena (1967, pp.229-230): 
Value as an abstract noun 
Value as an abstract noun is used in three different ways: 
(a) in a narrow sense, where it applies strictly to the good, the worthwhile, or the 
desirable; 
(b) in a wider sense; this extends "value" to the beautiful, the virtuous, the right, 
the true, the holy etc.; 
( c) in its widest sense, "value" covers all kinds of critical (evaluative) predicates. 
Value as a concrete noun 
Value as a concrete noun has two common usages; these correspond largely to the 
distinction between object value and value-as-criterion: 
(a) value refers to what has value or is valuable; thus one speaks of things that 
are good, right, beautiful, or even true (object value); 
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(b) value refers to what is valued, judged to be of value, or desired; thus one 
speaks of "individual values", "MaoriIPakeha values", and "Christian values" 
(value-as-criterion ). 
Value as a verb 
Value as a verb occurs in expressions like "to value", "evaluate" and "valuing". 
Depending on whether a narrow or wider interpretation of value (as abstract noun) 
is chosen, "to value" covers a narrow or wider range of evaluating acts. Thus, "to 
value" may refer only to judgements about the good and the worthwhile, or it may 
also cover judgements about beauty, truth and virtue. 
A further differentiation is often made between two meanings of "to value": on the 
one hand, the term is used in the sense of "to like", "to desire" or "to hold dear", 
signifying an emotive response; on the other hand, it may be used in the sense of a 
reflective, conscious act of comparison, i.e., an act of cognition. The former, then, is 
referred to as valuation, the latter as evaluation. 
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Section Three 
Theories and concepts of value in philosophy 
The phenomenon of "value" has been a fundamental issue in philosophy from the 
time of Plato, although the common usage of the term "value" in philosophy extends 
only back to the nineteenth century. Before that time, value phenomena were 
discussed in terms of the good, the right, beauty, virtue, truth, obligation, moral 
judgement, aesthetic judgement etc. The recognition that all these separate 
concepts are based on the same underlying structure led to the development of 
"value theory" through the works of such eminent philosophers as Lotze, Meinong, 
von Ehrenfels, and later Scheler, Nicolai Hartman, Perry, Dewey and Pepper. The 
common ground of concepts such as the good, the beautiful, the right is that they 
deal essentially with what ought to be, rather than with what is. This distinction 
between value (what ought to be) and fact (what is) pervades all of the social 
sciences and humanities and is the subject of considerable debate, most recently in 
the area of policy analysis. 
3.1 A typology of theories of value 
The development of concepts and measures of value in philosophy, the social and 
behavioural sciences, and in economics is based on theories of value. In order to 
provide a foundation for the discussion of value phenomena, and to clarify the 
assumptions underlying different conceptions of value, this section presents a brief 
typology of theories of value. The typology is based on Gewirth (1985) who 
discusses normative and meta-normative theories from an ethical perspective, and 
Dunn's (1983) classification from a policy analysis perspective. The reader is 
referred to Figure 3.1 on the following page for a "visual" guide. 
A primary distinction can be drawn between descriptive, normative, and meta-
normative theories of value: 
(a) descriptive theories of value make statements about what is in the realm of 
value(s); for example, they seek to describe what values are actually held by a 
group of people. Descriptive theories of value are predominantly found in 
the social and behavioural sciences; in philosophy, descriptive statements 
about what is valued are usually ancillary to normative and meta-normative 
discussions (Frankena, 1967); 
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(b) normative theories of value make judgements about what ought to be in the 
realm of values; for example, they make claims about what constitutes "just", 
"good", or "moral" behaviour for an individual as well as for society; 
(c) meta-normative theories analyse value and valuation; they define what 
"goodness" and value are, what it means to say that something is "good" or has 
value, and which criteria can be employed to evaluate normative theories. 
Thus, meta-normative theories provide the foundation for normative and 
descriptive theories of value. 
3.1.1 Descriptive theories of value 
Among the descriptive theories of value, one can distinguish between those that 
concern themselves with assigned value, and those that see value-as-criterion as their 
object of inquiry. The principal exponent of the former is the field of positive 
economics, whilst the latter provides the foundation for empirical value research in 
sociology, anthropology, psychology and social psychology. 
Following Dunn (1983), this second group concerning itself with value-as-criterion 
can be further separated into theories employing basic, complex, and developmental 
value typologies. 
3.1.1.1 Basic value typologies 
Basic value typologies are characterised by the attempt to reduce the enormous 
range and complexity of human values (value-as-criterion) to a simple means-ends 
classification, i.e. human values are either oriented towards desirable end-states of 
existence, or towards desirable modes of conduct. This type of classification is 
exemplified by the work of Milton Rokeach (1968, 1973); he uses the labels 
"terminal" for ends-related values, and "instrumental" for means-related values (see 
also Section 4.3.1.4). 
3.1.1.2 Complex value typologies 
Complex value typologies use a greater number of classificational principles to 
provide a precise mechanism for discussing aspects of the phenomenon "value". An 
example of a complex value typology can be found in Rescher (1969); Rescher 
examines six main principles for classifying values: 
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(a) classification by subscribership; by asking "who holds the value?", groupings 
such as personal values, community values, professional values, or national 
values can be obtained; 
(b) classification by the objects at issue; values are classified with reference to the 
object or class of objects to which they apply. Thus, one can distinguish 
between object values, individual or personal values, group or societal values, 
environmental values etc.; 
(c) classification by the nature of the benefit; values are classified according to the 
human wants, needs, and interest that are served by their realisation~ Such 
categories are aesthetic values, spiritual values, political values, economic 
values; 
(d) classification by the purposes at issue; values may be classified according to 
the specific purpose served by the realisation of a benefit. Thus, we speak of 
nutritional value, exchange value, deterrent value, truth value; 
(e) classification by the relationship between subscriber and beneficiary; this yields 
e.g. the categories of self-oriented (or egocentric) values, patriotic values, 
humanitarian values, or eco-centric values; 
(f) classification by the relationship between values; some values can be viewed as 
systematically subordinate to others in that they facilitate the achievement of 
other values. Thus, one can distinguish between instrumental, extrinsic, or 
means values, and terminal, intrinsic or end values. 
This kind of typology allows a very differentiated yet systematic analysis of value 
phenomena by emphasising the perspective from which "value" is observed. Note 
that the same value can be simultaneously classified in many different ways. 
3.1.1.3 Developmental value typologies 
Where changes in values (value-as-criterion) over time are the object of interest, a 
developmental typology like Kohlberg's (1961, 1983) stages of moral development is 
to be considered. Kohlberg suggests that the moral development of individuals as 
well as of societies follows six sequential stages: 
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Stage 1: 
Stage 2: 
Stage 3: 
Stage 4: 
StageS: 
Stage 6: 
punishment and obedience orientation 
instrumental relativist orientation 
interpersonal concordance orientation 
law-and-order orientation 
social-contract legalistic orientation 
universal ethical principle orientation. 
Because development through these stages follows sequentially and transitions can 
only occur between adjacent stages, Kohlberg claims that individuals cannot be 
expected to move directly from an egocentric market society (Stage 2) to a society 
based on universal ethical principles (Stage 6) (c.f. Dunn, 1983). This hypothesis 
may be of some significance for policy development that aims at changing societal 
values, e.g. in the area of environmental attitudes. 
3.1.2 Normative theories of value 
Normative theories of value make judgements about what constitutes "just", "good", 
or "moral" behaviour for an individual as well as for a society. On the basis of the 
criteria by which moral actions are evaluated, normative theories can be classified 
into four major types: deontological, teleological, axiological, and practical (or "good 
reason") theories of value. 
3.1.2.1 Deontological normative theories 
Deontological theories evaluate actions according to their inherent "rightness" which 
requires no further justification (material deontological theories), or on the basis of 
some formal principle (formal de ontological theories). For example, John Rawls 
(1971) argues in his famous Theory of justice that a just society uses the maxi-min 
criterion as a social decision rule (maxi-min = society maximises the welfare of 
those who are worst off); however, it is not claimed that maxi-min is inherently 
"right" or "just", but that a group of people deciding on a social contract without 
knowing what their social or economic position in that society would be would choose 
the maxi-min criterion as a social decision rule~ Thus, the normative criterion 
(maxi-min) is justified by a formal, universal principle (choice under a "veil of 
ignorance"). 
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3.1.2.2 Teleological normative theories 
Teleological theories evaluate actions according to the "goodness" of their outcomes. 
Probably the best known teleological theory is utilitarianism, originated by Bentham 
and J.S. Mill. Utilitarianism holds that a "good" action is one that promotes the 
greatest good for the greatest number of people; thus, the normative criterion is the 
"goodness" or "value" of the consequences of actions, as opposed to the inherent 
"rightness" of the action, or its conformity to some formal principle as in 
deontological theories. Teleological theories, and in particular the various forms of 
utilitarianism, are very important in a natural resource management context, as they 
provide the philosophical foundation of mainstream welfare economics (see Section 
5.1). 
3.1.2.3 Axiological normative theories 
Axiological theories are closely related to teleological theories; both rely on 
"goodness" or value as normative criterion. However, axiological theories evaluate 
actions on the basis of their inherent goodness, as opposed to the (teleological) 
goodness of the outcomes. 
The distinction between de ontological and axiological theories is that (material) 
deontologists claim that some actions are inherently right or obligatory (Greek: 
deontos, "of the obligatory"), whereas axiologists base their claims on inherent 
goodness or value (Greek: axios, "worthy" or "valuable"). 
3.1.2.4 Practical normative theories 
Practical or "good reason" normative theories emphasise reasoned discourse as 
criterion for a normative evaluation of actions. Actions are claimed to be "good" or 
"right" if they conform to some rules, or result in outcomes, that have been 
developed through reasoned discourse among those who develop moral rules, and 
those who are affected by them. These comparatively recent ethical theories (Baier, 
1965; Habermas, 1970; Taylor, 1961; Toulmin, 1950) form the basis of some 
contemporary work in policy analysis dealing with the role of values and ethics in 
public policy (Dunn, 1982; Fisher, 1980), and in environmental ethics (Tribe, 1976) . 
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3.1.3 Meta-normative theories of value 
Meta-normative theories provide the philosophical foundation for normative as well as 
descriptive theories of value. Meta-normative theory addresses questions like: "is there 
ethical knowledge, and if so, of what kind is this knowledge?"; "can the truth of normative 
claims be determined?", or "what is the nature of the phenomenon value?". 
Meta-normative theories can be divided into two major classes: cognitivist and non-
cognitivist theories. The fundamental difference between these is their answer to the 
question: "do moral judgements constitute a kind of knowledge?" i.e. they differ in their 
assessment of the epistemological status of normative theories. Cognitivism holds that 
normative theories do constitute some kind of knowledge, and that normative claims can 
be true or false; non-cognitivism denies this. Both cognitivism and non-cognitivism can 
be further divided into several schools of thought that differ substantially in their 
assumptions about the nature of value phenomena. 
3.1.3.1 Non-naturalistic cognitivism 
There are two main schools of thought within cognitivism: naturalism, and non-
naturalism. While both schools maintain that normative ethics do constitute some kind 
of knowledge, they differ in their assessment of the nature of this knowledge; naturalism 
maintains that ethical knowledge is not fundamentally different from empirical 
knowledge, and thus can be established by the same methods as those used in the natural 
and social sciences. In contrast, non-naturalism claims that ethical knowledge is quite 
distinct from other knowledge and cannot be revealed by scientific methods; moral terms 
such as "good" refer to non-natural properties of objects that cannot be defined. Thus, 
non-naturalism is essentially an objectivist doctrine. Because non-naturalists maintain that 
values are intuited through emotions, rather than revealed by scientific methods, they are 
frequently called "intuitionists". Most prominent among them are Plato, G.E. Moore, 
Scheler, and Nicolai Hartman; Moore's Principia ethica (1903) is a particularly well-
known example of non-naturalistic cognitivism. 
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3.1.3.2 Naturalistic cognitivism 
According to the naturalists, ethical knowledge can in principle be revealed and tested 
using scientific methods and empirical observation. However, some further distinctions 
within this school of thought can be made on the basis of their stance towards (a) the 
source of ethical knowledge, and (b) the procedures by which this knowledge is 
established. 
Objectivist naturalism maintains that value, the "good", and the "right" are inherent 
properties of objects that do not depend on an outside observer. In contrast, subjectivist 
naturalism sees the source of value in the interaction between observer and the observed; 
it is thus meaningless to speak of "value" without a valuing subject. 
Finally, opinions differ among subjectivists over the procedures by which (relational) 
ethical knowledge is revealed: epistemic subjectivism relies on reflective evaluation of 
interests, desires, and preferences, while non-epistemic subjectivism relies on the mere 
expression of interests, desires, and preferences. 
Naturalists like the philosophers Dewey (1939) (epistemic subjectivism) and Perry (1954) 
(non-epistemic subjectivism) have had a strong influence on the developments in the 
social and behavioural sciences. 
3.1.3.3 Non-cognitivism 
As mentioned above, non-cognitivism maintains that normative theories do not constitute 
knowledge, and are thus not subject to verification or falsification. The question then 
arises about the meaning of a normative claim if it does not constitute some kind of 
knowledge. Several possible meanings are suggested by the non-cognitivists, the most 
important of which are emotive, prescriptive and commendatory (Dunn, 1983). 
Emotivism states that normative claims merely express the feelings of whoever makes the 
claim, and they thus have no cognitive meaning whatsoever. Prescriptivism maintains that 
ethical claims are not merely expressions of feelings but commands that tell people what 
to do. Commendatory non-cognitivism suggests that normative claims simply commend 
some behaviour or object to somebody else. 
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It is self-evident that non-cognitivism, in denying that normative claims represent 
knowledge that is inter-subjectively verifiable, subscribes to a subjectivist 
interpretation of value. Major exponents of non-cognitivism are Ayer, Carnap, 
Stevenson, Hare, and Bertrand Russell. 
3.2 Axiology: the general theory of value 
3.2.1 Foundations of axiology 
The present discussion of axiology is based on the use of "value" as an abstract noun 
in its widest sense; thus, axiology is the general theory of all critical predicates. 
However, the discussion applies mutatis mutandis to a narrower use of value; in this 
narrower sense, axiology deals only with certain kinds of critical predicates and is a 
part of ethics or moral philosophy, that branch of philosophy that is concerned with 
what is morally good and bad, right or wrong. 
The development of axiology as a general theory of value and valuation was initiated 
in the second half of the nineteenth century by the German philosopher Rudolf 
Hermann Lotze. Axiologists set out to develop a generic conception of value (as 
abstract noun) to provide a unified basis for the wide range of contexts in which acts 
of evaluation take place. Rather than dealing with the enormous variety of diverse 
values and the infinity of situations where valuation takes place, the general 
phenomenon of valuation is subjected to scrutiny. 
Following Lotze and Brentano, Meinong suggested that the "value experience" 
involves four ingredients: 
"1. The value subject who experiences 
2. A positive (or negative) emotion called the value feeling directed 
at 
3. A real or an "intentional" (nonexistent) object, a value object that 
is the thing with respect to which the evaluation is made, the 
value feeling being produced in the value subject (not by the 
value object itself, but) by the value subject's entertaining 
(though not necessarily accepting) 
4. An existence judgement about the realization or existence of this 
value object" (Meinong, 1894, c.f. Rescher, 1969, p.51). 
This separation of the "value experience" into components raises two fundamental 
questions that are central to any axiological theory: 
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(a) is value a property of an object independent of any observer or valuing 
subject, or is it a relation between the object and the valuing subject? 
(b) is the perception of value a personal, entirely intuitive experience, or is there 
an objective basis to it that can be investigated using scientific methods? 
Meinong's position with regard to these questions constitutes the first systematic 
statement of what is today known as the subjectivist interpretation of value. 
Well-known antecedents to this conception of value can be found in Thomas 
Hobbes' Leviathan, and David Hume's Treatise of human nature (c.f. Frondizi, 
1971, p.39). 
Subjectivism maintains that value arises from the relation between the valuing 
subject and the value object. It has had a profound influence on the development of 
philosophy in this century, as well as on the emerging social and behavioural 
sciences. Subjectivism is epitomised by Perry's view that " ... a thing - any thing - has 
value, or is valuable, in the original and generic sense when it is the object of an 
interest - any interest. Or, whatever is object of interest is ipso facto valuable" 
(Perry, 1954, pp.2-3). 
The contrasting view is known as objectivism. It holds that value belongs to objects 
independent of whether they are desired, enjoyed or valued by people. The most 
prominent exponents of objectivism are Plato, Scheler, Nicolai Hartman, a.E. 
- . . . 
Moore, and, in his later years, Meinong, who came to adopt a position quite contrary 
to his earlier subjectivism. The objectivist school of thought contends that value is 
revealed through the process of intuition, either emotive or intellectual. 
The distinction between objectivist and subjectivist doctrines is of course just one of 
many ways to separate different schools of philosophical thought; depending on 
other fundamental assumptions about the nature of value and the knowledge of 
value, other classes arise. 
The debate between objectivism and subjectivism is of more than just historical 
interest; in the context of the Environment Act 1986, which requires that the 
Ministry for the Environment take full and balanced account of (inter alia) lithe 
intrinsic values of ecosystems", a clarification of the philosophical assumptions 
underlying the use of the concept of value in legislation is essential. Both 
subjectivist and objectivist doctrines are very much alive today, and both employ the 
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concept of "intrinsic" values, but they differ substantially in their assumptions about the 
source of such values. Recent contributions in the field of environmental ethics discuss 
both objectivist as well as subjectivist elements (see e.g. Astbury et al., 1988; Bellet, 1989; 
Callicott, 1984, 1985; Fox, 1984; Howell, 1986; Naess, 1973; an excellent critical account 
of objectivism v. subjectivism can be found in Frondizi, 1971). 
3.2.2 Classifications of "value" 
In order to structure the inquiry into value phenomena philosophers often distinguish 
between different types or classes of value. Due to the complexity of the phenomenon 
''value'', a great number of different approaches to value classification are possible; the 
choice of classificational principles depends on the purpose of inquiry and the underlying 
assumptions regarding the domain of value and the relation between value and fact (see 
e.g. Rescher's (1969) list of principles in Section 3.1.1.2). In order to give an indication 
of the variety of possible classifications, the approaches of Perry, Lewis, Von Wright, and 
Robert S. Hartman are presented in this section. 
A common distinction, based on the wider perception of ''value'', is made between the 
various aspects of human existence in which value phenomena are observed; this is 
exemplified in Perry's "realms" of value (1926, 1954). Perry lists eight realms of value: 
(a) morality 
(b) the arts 
(c) SCIence 
(d) religion 
(e) economics 
(f) politics 
(g) law 
(h) custom or etiquette. 
This classification provides the foundation for some empirical work in the social sciences, 
for example the classic Study of values (Allport et ale 1960). 
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From a narrower conception of ''value'', Lewis (1946) distinguishes among: 
(a) utility, i.e. the usefulness for some purpose 
(b) extrinsic or instrumental value, i.e. being valuable as a means to something 
else 
(c) inherent value, i.e. producing valued experiences when observed 
(d) intrinsic value, i.e. being valuable in itself, or as an end 
(e) contributory value, the value that something contributes to a greater whole of 
which it is a part. 
A simple example, eludicating Lewis' distinctions, is provided by Frankena (1967): 
"A stick of wood may be useful in making a violin, a violin may be 
extrinsically good by being a means to good music, the music may be 
inherently good if hearing it is enjoyable, the experience of hearing it 
may be intrinsically good or valuable if it is enjoyable for its own sake, 
and it may also be contributively good if it is part of a good evening or 
week end" (p.230). 
Von Wright (1963) suggests the following varieties of "goodness": 
(a) instrumental goodness, i.e. useful for a purpose 
(b) technical goodness, i.e. being good or skilled at something 
(c) utilitarian goodness, i.e. resulting in good outcomes 
(d) hedonic goodness, i.e. pleasantness 
(e) welfare, i.e. the good of society. 
A very precise formulation of three basic categories of value is provided by Robert 
S. Hartman (1967). Hartman first considers the relation between fact and value by 
introducing the notions of the extension of a concept, and its intension. The extension 
of a concept defines a class of objects by indicating features they possess in common. 
The intension of a concept is the set of qualities prescribed for any object that make 
it a "good" or "fit" member of that class of objects. For example, the objects 
belonging to the class "chair" share the common features of legs, a seat and a back in 
an arrangement and size to support a human being in a sitting position; this is the 
extension of the concept "chair". The intension of the concept "chair" prescribes, for 
example, that the legs are solid and of equal length, that the back is not broken and 
the seat not split; to the. extent that a particular chair meets the requirements of the 
intension of the concept "chair", it is a "good" chair or a "useless" chair (Wieman, 
1972). Thus, facts are found within the extension of a concept, while values are 
found within the intension of a concept. 
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Hartman distinguishes between the intensions of three different types of concepts 
(synthetic, analytic, and singular), and thus derives three fundamental types of value. 
(a) Systemic value is the extent to which the intension of a synthetic concept is 
fulfilled. A synthetic concept is a construct of the human mind, rather than 
an empirical thing; synthetic concepts have finite and denumerable properties 
because they corne into being by definition. Systemic value is thus simply the 
match between a thing and the definition of its concept, because this 
definition is equal to the intension of the concept. For example, the concept 
"triangle" can be defined as "a closed plane figure bounded by three straight 
lines"; by adding another line to a particular triangle, or replacing one 
straight line with a curve the triangle is not turned into a "better" or "worse" 
triangle, but it is turned into a non-triangle (Brumbaugh, 1972). Systemic 
value is therefore of the true/false variety: either the intension of a synthetic 
concept is fulfilled, or it is not. 
(b) Extrinsic value is the value that empirical objects have to the extent that they 
fulfil the intension of an analytic concept. Because the intension of an 
analytic concept derives from the abstraction of common attributes of a class 
of objects, it can contain an infinite but denumerable number of properties. 
Empirical objects (chairs, for example) do not need to possess all the 
attributes prescribed by the intension of their concept; they may possess them 
to a degree, and to that degree they have extrinsic value. 
(c) Intrinsic value is the value found in any uniquely individual object, fulfilling 
the intension of a singular concept. A singular concept is not based on 
common attributes of a class of objects; rather, it defines one, and only one 
unique object with infinite and non-denumerable properties. 
In this classification, the complexity of value increases from the systemic level (for 
example the class of human beings) to the extrinsic (an abstract person in society) to 
the intrinsic (a particular, unique individual). 
3.2.3 Intrinsic v. instrumental value 
Axiologists view the topic of their concern as something distinctive and special; they 
are not overly concerned with the more mundane types of valuation such as the 
decorative value of a vase, but with "higher" or more fundamental values (Rescher, 
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1969, p.53). Thus, a lot of axiological attention is focused on intrinsic value as 
opposed to instrumental value, i.e. upon what is valued as an end in itself as opposed 
to what is valued as a means to some end. This emphasis on end values is of special 
importance in ethics, as evidenced by Wittgenstein's (1965) comment, that ethics is 
concerned with what is good, not in the sense in which a pIece of furniture might be 
said to be good (e.g. for seating or decoration or firewood), but in the sense of "what 
is really important" in life. 
A major question in this connection is the nature of end values; i.e. the criteria of 
intrinsic value. This is where the major ethical systems diverge. A primary 
distinction exists between monist and pluralist theories; monist theories maintain 
that there is, in the final analysis, only one criterion of intrinsic value, while pluralist 
theories hold that there are a number of criteria. 
Among the monist theories, a further distinction between hedonistic and 
anti-hedonistic theories is commonly made; hedonists (and quasi-hedonists) contend 
that the criterion of intrinsic value is pleasure, respectively satisfaction. Thus, all 
experiences that are intrinsically good are pleasant, and all pleasant experiences are 
intrinsically good. Principal exponents of this school of thought are Hume, Bentham, 
1.S. Mill, von Ehrenfels, the early Meinong, Dewey and Lewis (c.f. Frankena, 1967). 
Anti-hedonistic philosophers have suggested a range of alternative criteria for 
intrinsic value such as communion with god (Augustine, Aquinas), knowledge 
(Spinoza), self-realisation (Bradley) or power (Nietzsche) (c.f. Frankena, 1967). 
Pluralistic philosophers (Plato, G.E. Moore, Scheler, Hartman and Perry) suggest a 
wide range of co-existing criteria of intrinsic goodness, such as pleasure, knowledge, 
beauty, truth, harmony, love, friendship, justice etc. (c.f. Frankena, 1967). 
The nature and definition of intrinsic value are of particular concern to 
environmental philosophers (see e.g. Gunn, 1988, or Fox, 1984). While the 
mainstream of ethics or moral philosophy often restricts intrinsic value, and thus 
moral consideration, to rational beings (Kant) or sentient beings (Bentham) (c.f. 
Routley, 1973; Callicott, 1985), environmental ethics attempts to extend the moral 
community beyond humans to include animals, life in general, the biosphere, and 
finally the cosmos. According to Regan (1981) it is essential for the development of 
an environment ethic to assign intrinsic or inherent value to nature; in the absence of 
this, an environment ethic is reduced to a "management ethic". 
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A recent approach to extending intrinsic value to non-human entities is based on the 
argument that a contemporary view of physics (Le. post 1925) forces the 
abandonment of the traditional object-subject distinction; it is argued that, if the 
universe is not made up of discrete objects but everything is interconnected, then 
intrinsic value in humans must extend by definition to the rest of the universe. Thus, 
moral considerability is conferred upon nature. This perception of the biosphere or 
the cosmos as a unified entity adds a new dimension to the question of the carner of 
value ("Werttragertl), which exercised objectivist philosophers from Plato to Scheler. 
(For a discussion of intrinsic value and quantum theory, see e.g. Fox, 1984 and 
Callicott, 1985; philosophical perspectives of quantum theory are explored e.g. in 
Eddington, 1958, Heisenberg, 1959, Jammer, 1974, and Capra, 1976; for an 
entertaining non-technical account of a quantum-mechanical view of reality see 
Gribbin, 1984.) 
It is evident from this brief sketch of some key issues in the general theory of value 
that the realms of value are indeed vast; the meaning of "value" in any given context 
depends on a substantial number of underlying assumptions, representing 
fundamentally different views of the world and major philosophical schools of 
thought. These different views of the world, and in particular the ethical stance that 
is adopted, are not only of significance to philosophers: they also provide the 
foundations for the social and behavioural sciences, as well as for economics. 
3.3 Summary 
Concepts of value are used in a wide variety of contexts and meanings in philosophy. 
Philosophers differ substantially in their meta-normative assumptions, as well as in 
the normative theories developed on the basis of these assumptions. A very 
important distinction among meta-normative theories is the choice of an objectivist 
or a subjectivist interpretation of "value"; this distinction pervades all meta-
normative theories regardless of their other assumptions. Many classifications of 
values contain the class of "intrinsic value"; however, there are significant differences 
between the respective contents of that class, although they generally refer to some 
kind of end value. In order to interpret the references to "value" in the Environment 
Act 1986, a clarification of the underlying philosophical assumptions appears 
necessary. 
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Section Four 
Concepts and measures of value in the 
social and behavioural sciences 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous section has introduced a number of concepts and classifications of 
value that are of interest in the broad domain of philosophy. In addition, an 
overview of theories of value was presented; these theories provide a foundation not 
only for philosophy, but also for the social and behavioural sciences, and for 
economics. 
Much of the philosophical inquiry into the phenomenon of value is concerned with 
value-as criterion, i.e., with the standards in terms of which evaluations are made. 
Moreover, substantial areas of philosophy, including ethics, political philosophy, and 
the philosophy of art, adopt a normative stance in their investigation of value-as-
criterion; thus, they are concerned with what ought to be in the realms of value. The 
social and behavioural sciences, including disciplines such as sociology, psychology, 
social psychology, and anthropology, share this focus on value-as-criterion insofar as 
they are concerned with value phenomena. However, here, the emphasis lies on the 
descriptive investigation of value(s); hence, these disciplines inquire into what is in 
the realms of value. 
The general object of inquiry of the social and behavioural sciences is the 
description and explanation of human behaviour on the individual as well as on the 
social level. Values-as-criteria are of interest in this area because they can 
contribute to the explanation of human behaviour: as standards of evaluation, they 
provide reasons or motives for human actions; therefore, they are seen as 
explanatory variables of individual and social behaviour (see e.g. Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975; Feather, 1979; Neuman, 1986; Rescher, 1969; Rokeach, 1973; Schuman & 
Johnson, 1976). 
In contrast to philosophy and economics, which have explicitly dealt with value 
phenomena in one form or another for a very long time, the social and behavioural 
sciences have generally avoided the use of value concepts until well into the 
twentieth century. A major reason for this was the perceived fact-value dichotomy; 
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values were often regarded as subjective, and therefore not thought to be proper 
objects of scientific study (Williams, 1968)~ 
However, the last 60 years have seen significant contributions to the study of values 
from the broad domain of the social and behavioural sciences. While many 
distinctive concepts of value and methods of empirical value research have evolved 
in these disciplines, several reasons suggest that they should be treated as a whole for 
the purposes of this study: firstly, as a group, the value concepts that are employed 
are quite distinct from the concepts of value that are used in philosophy and 
economics; secondly, while there is an abundance of different concepts and 
definitions available within this group, most of them rest on very similar key 
elements; finally, the empirical research in these disciplines is based on a number of 
common methods. 
4.2 The domain of value(s) 
Value research in the social and behavioural sciences is based on normative and 
meta-normative theories of value, and on philosophical concepts of value as 
discussed in Section 3. Accordingly, the domain covered by the term "valuell can 
range from the restrictive to the comprehensive. 
A somewhat restrictive definition of "valuell, and, according to Williams (1968), one 
of the more widely used ones in the social science literature, considers values to be 
conceptions of the desirable, influencing selective behaviour (Kluckhohn, 1951). 
Here, a clear distinction is made between what is desirable, and what is (merely) 
desired; the desirable is what ought to be desired, or what is worthy of being desired. 
Therefore, such a definition of value restricts the domain of descriptive value inquiry 
by the application of a normative criterion. Evidently, this normative criterion itself 
is a value-as-criterion; hence, the distinction between the desirable and the desired 
expresses a preference for one over the other. 
Following Perry (1926, 1954), a broad and comprehensive definition of value(s) 
includes anything of interest to human subjects, all kinds of desires, wants, likes, 
pleasures, needs, interests, preferences, duties and many other modalities of 
selective behaviour (Pepper, 1958). 
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4.2.1 Values and related concepts 
The term "value(s)" can be used in two ways: it can refer to value-as-criterion in 
general, and is then frequently used interchangeably with terms such as attitudes, 
norms, and motives; but it can also refer to one particular type or class of 
value-as-criterion, in distinction from other classes such as attitudes and norms. To 
avoid confusion about the two different usages of the term "value(s)", the following 
convention will be adopted for the rest of this section: the term "value(s)" will be 
used to refer to fundamental, evaluative beliefs along the lines of Rokeach's 
definition given below. The collection of concepts such as "value(s)" and "attitudes" 
will be generically referred to as "value-as-criterion". 
Rokeach suggests the following definitions for the key concepts of value and attitude: 
"A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or 
end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an 
opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence" 
(Rokeach, 1973, p.5). 
"An attitude is a relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an 
object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential 
manner" (Rokeach, 1968, p.450; italics added). 
Values and attitudes (in Rokeach's framework) are closely related concepts; but 
whereas values transcend situations, attitudes are situation-specific, and whereas a 
value can be seen as a single, non-reducible element, attitudes refer to an 
organisation of several beliefs or underlying values. Attitudes are formed by the 
application of the relevant values pertaining to a specific situation or class of 
situations. In this sense, values are a much more fundamental concept than 
attitudes. 
The distinction between values and norms is similar to the distinction between 
values and attitudes: norms are an application of values to specific situations. One 
or more values may give rise to a norm, and "[t]he same value may be a point of 
reference for a great many specific norms" (Williams, 1968, p.284). However, in 
contrast to attitudes, norms as specific rules of conduct are a reflection of the values 
and attitudes of a group of people, brought to bear on the individual or on a group. 
For example, a person may hold a fundamental belief about the equality of all 
humans; on the basis of this value, a personal attitude towards gender discrimination 
in the workplace may be formed; if the value "equality of all humans" is shared by a 
group of people, a social norm such as "equal pay for equal work" may arise. The 
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more general and abstract a norm, the more difficult it is to distinguish from values; 
the same is of course true of attitudes (Dunn,1983; Williams, 1968). 
The relation of needs to values-as-criteria is also of interest to value researchers. 
Biological and social needs can be seen as prerequisites for the development of 
values. For example, Schwartz & Bilsky (1987) derive eight distinct motivational or 
value domains from an analysis of the biological and social needs of the human 
organism. The term "value domain" refers to a grouping of values that are associated 
with a particular class of needs; distinct value domains identified by Schwartz & 
Bilsky include "enjoyment", "security", "social power", and "self-direction". Thus, 
needs may give rise to values, and values in turn are reflected in attitudes or, on a 
social level, in norms. 
The totality of the values held by an individual or a group, including the relations 
between these values, constitute a value system: 
"A value system is an organized set of preferential standards that are 
used in making selections of objects and actions, resolving conflicts, 
invoking social sanctions, and coping with needs or claims for social 
and psychological defenses of choices made or proposed" (Williams, 
1979, p.20). 
Because the values contained in a value system may conflict with each other, the 
notion of an ordering within the value system is introduced: 
"A value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning 
preferables modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a 
continuum of relative importance" (Rokeach, 1973, p.5; italics added). 
On the group level, terms like "social value system", "cultural value system" or 
"organisational value system" are frequently used to denote the ordering of the 
values held by a particular group of people. 
Values, as beliefs, are commonly seen as having cognitive, affective and behavioural 
components (Rokeach, 1973): 
(a) a value is a cognition, in that it refers to some kind of perception or 
knowledge about a correct end state to strive for, or a correct way of 
behaving; 
(b) a value is an affective component, in that people can feel emotional about it; 
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(c) a value is a behavioural component in that it is an interceding variable that 
leads to action when activated. 
The major features of the concept value(s) as it is used in the social and behavioural 
sciences can thus be summarised as follows (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987); values are: 
( a) concepts or beliefs, 
(b) about desirable end states or behaviours, 
( c) that transcend specific situations, 
(d) guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and 
(e) are ordered by relative importance. 
4.2.2 The enduring nature of values 
Values, as defined above, are not something that humans are born with; they are 
learned and developed in interaction with other humans, and through the experience 
of countless decision situations. Thus, values are a function of a person's history, 
and in particular of early childhood and adolescence (see e.g. Kohlberg, 1983). The 
way values are initially taught and learned has much to do with the comparative 
stability of values and value systems; values are taught and learned as absolutes and 
with little reference to other, possibly competing, values. As Rokeach observes: 
"[we] are not taught that it is desirable, for example, to be just a little 
bit honest or logical, or to strive for just a little bit of salvation or 
peace. Nor are we taught that such modes or end-states are 
sometimes desirable and sometimes not" (Rokeach, 1973, p.6). 
However, as children mature they are exposed to increasingly complex decision 
situations; they encounter situations where several competing values apply that have 
to be traded off against each other. Thus, a set of isolated, absolute values gradually 
changes into a complex system of hierarchically ordered values. This value system 
changes throughout the rest of one's life; usually, this change is a slow and gradual 
one although it often follows certain developmental patterns (see e.g. Allport, 1961; 
Kohlberg, 1983; Rescher, 1969, pp'111-11S). Occasionally, there may occur a 
substantial reordering of the value system, a veritable shift of paradigm; this is often 
associated with a substantial change in the circumstances of one's life, or by being 
exposed to a value system radically different from one's own, as for example in the 
case of a religious conversion. In general, though, values are perceived to have an 
enduring or permanent character. 
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4.3 The empirical study of values 
Any research that attempts to describe, measure, or analyse value-as-criterion faces a 
major obstacle: these standards of evaluation are psychological properties of the mind, 
not directly observable objects or phenomena. The concept of value-as-criterion is 
nothing but a mental construct for that which makes people prefer one thing over 
another, choose one course of action when several are available. In contrast to many 
other phenomena, particularly in the natural sciences, it is extremely difficult to isolate 
the phenomenon value-as-criterion in operation, and thence to describe and measure it. 
In the absence of direct observation methods, social and behavioural scientists have to 
rely on several indirect lines of evidence to describe and analyse value-as-criterion 
(Williams, 1968). In the first instance, the research can be based on testimonial evidence 
by asking an individual what values or attitudes s/he holds. Depending on the particular 
object of inquiry, the evidence can be gathered by open or structured interviews, or 
through the administration of a questionnaire. Examples of these widely practised 
methods are candidate interviews, political surveys, and market research. There are a 
number of potential sources of error associated with testimonial evidence (see e.g. 
Dillman, 1978): 
(a) the subject may have only limited knowledge of his or her values-as-criteria; 
(b) the subject may not be willing to reveal the information truthfUlly; 
( c) the question may be misinterpreted by the subject, so that the answer does not 
address the object of inquiry; 
(d) the subject's answer, while addressing the question correctly, may be misinterpreted 
by the researcher; and 
(e) the researcher can introduce a biased response in the subject, either through 
the particular formulation of a question, or through his/her behaviour during 
the interview. 
A second line of inquiry is based on the observation and analysis of decisions that are 
made by the subject, either in an experimental situation, or in real life. By scrutinising 
the subject's decisions, the researcher can attempt to deduce the subject's values-as-
criteria from observed behaviour. A major problem in this type of research is the control 
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of the decision situation; for example, if the researcher and the subject do not coincide 
entirely in their perception or description of the decision situation (and they may not be 
aware of such a lack of coincidence), then any conclusion as to the values-as-criteria 
underlying a particular choice may be of questionable validity. 
Yet another method of gathering evidence about value-as-criterion is the systematic 
analysis of verbal material~ frequently called socio-linguistic content analysis. By subjecting 
the choice of words (for example, in documents published by an organisation) to empirical 
analysis on the basis of frequency counts and associations, underlying values and attitudes 
towards objects, situations and people can be revealed. This method can be particularly 
useful for analysing institutional or cultural values. Since the usage of language changes 
over time, this method can also be used to trace changes in social values, attitudes and 
norms over time (see e.g. Gerbener et al., 1969; Holsti, 1969; Rokeach, 1979; 
Rokeach et al., 1970). 
4.3.1 Instruments for the empirical study of value-as-criterion 
Empirical research on value-as-criterion over the past 60 years has seen the development 
of a vast number of specific instruments for the description of attitudes and values. 
Robinson & Shaver (1973) list over 100 established instruments in their compilation of 
Measures of social psychological attitudes; similar source books are provided by Chun et al. 
(1975), Lake et al. (1973) and Straus (1969). In addition to established and repeatedly 
used survey instruments, there are of course the familiar ad hoc attitude surveys covering 
a wide range of subjects in political life, market research, media studies etc. 
Even a cursory inspection of these instruments would be well beyond the scope of this 
study; thus, the present section is restricted to a brief description of three highly 
influential study formats that were designed to reveal fundamental values. In addition, 
a recent international value survey is briefly introduced. 
4.3.1.1 Study of values (Allport et al., 1960) 
Introduced in 1931, the Study of values measures the relative importance of six basic 
areas of interest or value. The construct measures what is desired, not what is desirable. 
The six areas are represented by: 
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(a) the theoretical person, placing high value on the discovery of truth; 
(b) the economic person, placing high value on that which is useful; 
(c) the aesthetic person, placing high value on beauty and harmony; 
(d) the social person, placing high value on altruistic and philanthropic love; 
(e) the political person, placing high value on power and influence; and 
(f) the religious person, placing high value on unity. 
The questionnaire contains 45 items, 30 of which are forced choice including the 
expression of strong or weak preference, and 15 that involve the rank ordering of 
four alternatives. 
The test can be self-administered and self-scored; standard scores for men and 
women are provided, so that the test subjects can interpret their own particular value 
profile. According to the authors, administration and scoring can be completed in 
one hour. 
4.3.1.2 Variations in value orientations (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961) 
This study attempts to measure the value orientations found in five different 
cultures: (a) a Spanish-American community, (b) a Mormon group, (c) a Texan 
group, (d) a Navaho group, and (e) a Zuni community. Thus, this study format is of 
particular interest to cross-cultural value comparisons. 
Kluckhohn (1951, pA09) defines a value orientation as "a set of linked propositions 
embracing both value and existential elements". The survey rests on the assumption 
that all people at all times face the same limited number of fundamental problems, 
and that there is only a limited range of possible solutions to these problems. The 
particular solutions found in a given culture reflect the value orientation of that 
culture. 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck identify five common human problems and postulate a 
range of variations of value orientations: 
(a) the character of human nature 
(variations: human nature can be conceived as evil, neutral or mixed, and 
good; and this may be mutable or immutable); 
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(b) the relation of people to nature 
(variations: sUbjugation to nature, harmony with nature, domination of 
nature); 
(c) the temporal focus of human life 
(variations: past, present, future); 
(d) the modality of human activity 
(variations: being, being-in-becoming, doing); and 
( e ) the relationship between people 
(variations: lineality, collaterality, individualism) 
The test consists (in its original application) of 22 items that involve the evaluation 
of two or three situations or statements. As the description of some of the items is 
quite lengthy and complex, interview time may vary quite considerably. The 
value-orientations format has also been used in the study of Japanese and other 
cultures (Albert, 1968; Robinson & Shaver, 1973). 
The use of variations in value orientations is not confined to descriptive studies; it 
can also be employed in futures studies or scenario building (see e.g. Hawrylyshyn, 
1980). A recent New Zealand example is the study Contexts for development (Zepke 
et al., 1981). In this study, two problem areas (the relationship between human 
beings, and the relationship between human beings and nature), each associated with 
two different value orientations, form the basis of scenario building. This type of 
study is usually restricted to two or three problem areas with few variations in value 
orientations, due to the proliferation of possible combinations with each added 
dimension. 
4.3.1.3 The European value systems study (Harding et al., 1986) 
The "European value systems study group" (EVSSG) in Amsterdam was established 
as a foundation in 1978 to design and conduct a major empirical study of the moral 
and social values underlying European social and public institutions, and governing 
conduct. The study format has been adopted by a number of non-European 
countries, amongst them New Zealand (Webster et al., in preparation). The study is 
based on an extensive questionnaire involving forced choice, multiple choice and 
rating questions. The main areas addressed in the New Zealand study were: 
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(1) leisure, hobbies and interests; 
(2) work; 
(3) meaning and purpose of life; 
(4) marriage and family life; 
(5) financial situation; 
(6) political and social issues; 
(7) demographic data; and 
(8) business in New Zealand. 
While the study does not focus on environmental and resource management issues, 
the section on political and social issues contains some questions about attitudes 
towards resource development, conservation of natural heritage and emphasis 
placed on material possessions and natural lifestyles. Furthermore, the questions 
relating to the ANZUS-nucle~ armed/propelled ships issue bear on attitudes 
towards the environment (Webster, pers. comm.). 
4.3.1.4 The Rokeach value survey (Rokeach, 1973) 
This instrument has found widespread use in a great variety of research fields over 
the past 20 years, and due to the large number of studies based on the Rokeach value 
survey (RVS), there is now an extensive international data base available. The 
instrument attempts to measure two fundamental types of values that underlie 
people's attitudes and behaviour: terminal values, referring to desirable end states of 
existence; and instrumental values, referring to desirable modes of conduct. Each 
category contains 18 values, presented on separate lists (see next page); respondents 
are asked to rank the values on the two lists (separately) in order of importance, 
usually by rearranging a set of gummed labels. The administration of the survey is 
simple and does not place great demands on respondents. The instrument is usually 
administered together with other questions, in order to relate values to attitudes and 
behaviour, or to demographic data. 
A major values research programme on the basis of the RVS, spanning almost two 
decades, has been carried out by N.T. Feathers (Feathers, 1985). The RVS is 
frequently used for cross-cultural comparisons (see e.g. Feather, 1979a and b, 1980). 
Recent applications in the context of environmental attitudes and conservation 
behaviour include Dunlap et al. (1981), Neuman (1986) and Rankin (1981). For 
further developments of the RVS see e.g. Braithwaite & Law (1985) and Schwarthz 
& Bilsky (1987). 
32 
Terminal values 
A comfortable life 
An exciting life 
. A sense of accomplishment 
A world at peace 
A world of beauty 
Equality 
Family security 
Freedom 
Happiness 
Inner harmony 
Mature love 
National security 
Pleasure 
Salvation 
Self-respect 
Social recognition 
True friendship 
Wisdom 
Instrumental values 
Ambitious 
Broadminded 
Capable 
Cheerful 
Clean 
Coura~eous 
Forgivmg 
Helpful 
Honest 
Imaginative 
Independent 
Intellectual 
Logical 
Lovin~ 
ObedIent 
Polite 
Responsible 
Self-controlled 
4.3.2 Individual and social value-as-criterion 
A substantial amount of the empirical value research within the social and 
behavioural sciences concerns itself with the values-as-criteria of groups or societies. 
The standard (implicit) assumption is that social standards of evaluation are a 
reflection of the evaluative standards of the individual members of the group or 
society (this assumption, and its philosophical foundations, will be discussed in detail 
in Section 5). 
Note that social values-as-criteria, revealed through empirical value research as 
discussed above, are not, strictly speaking, combinations or aggregates of individual 
values-as-criteria: they are merely descriptions of the distribution of individual 
values-as-criteria within the group that is of interest. These descriptions may be 
highly condensed through the use of statistical measures such as means, medians, 
and standard deviations, but they will always represent statements about the 
underlying individual phenomena. In order to arrive at the combined values-as-
criteria of some society, i.e., getting from the statement "the average member of 
society believes (x)" to "society believes (x)", a particular aggregation rule is needed; 
the problem of selecting such a rule will be briefly addressed in Section 5. 
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4.4 Summary 
The social and behavioural sciences are predominantly interested in value-as-
criterion, both as an explanatory variable, as well as for purely descriptive purposes. 
ItValues" are generally understood to be beliefs or conceptions of the desirable that 
influence selective behaviour. Empirical value research relies on survey methods, 
observation methods, experimental methods, and socio-linguistic content analysis. 
Many research instruments have been developed that can be employed to gain 
evidence about fundamental values, as well as about attitudes towards specific 
objects and situations. 
4.5 Selected bibliography 
Allport, G., Vernon, P. & Lindzey, G. (1960): Study of values, (3rd ed.). Houghton 
Mifflin Co., Boston. 
Feather, N.T. (1985): Beliefs, attitudes, and values. In: Feather, N.T.: Australian 
psyclwlogy: review of research. Allen & Unwin, Sydney. pp.187-217. 
Fishbein, M. & Aijzen, I. (1975): Belief, attitude, intention, and behaviour: an 
introduction to theory and research. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA. 
Holsti, O.R. (1969): Content analyses for the social sciences and humanities. 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Menlo Park CA. 
Kluckhohn, C. (1951): Values and value-orientations in the theory of action: an 
exploration in definition and classification. In: Parsons, T. and Shils, E. (eds): 
Toward a general theory of action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
Kluckhohn, F. and Strodtbeck, F. (1961): Variations in value orientations. Row, 
Peterson, Evanston. 
Maslow, A.H. (ed.) (1959): New knowledge in human values. Harper, New York. 
Pepper, S.c. (1958): The sources of value. University of California Press, Berkeley. 
34 
Perry, R.B. (1954): Realms of value: a critique of human civilization. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Robinson, J.P. & Shaver, P.R. (1973): Measures of social psychological attitudes. 
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
Rokeach, M. (1973): The nature of human values. The Free Press, New York. 
Smith, M.B. (1969): Social psychology and human values. Aldine, Chicago. 
35 
Section Five 
Concepts and measures of value in economics 
Economics has had a long history of dealing explicitly with concepts of "value"; 
according to Frankena (1967), the widespread use of the terms "value" and 
"valuation" began in economics long before it was adopted in philosophy during the 
last century. Economics concerns itself predominantly with the issue of choice as a 
fundamental aspect of human behaviour. As individuals, groups and societies, 
people are continuously in the situation of having to choose between a set of 
(imagined) alternative futures that come about as a result of human actions and their 
consequences. Choice cannot be avoided: not to act in a choice-situation is a choice 
in itself that carries its own set of consequences, and thus constitutes one of the 
alternative futures. 
Regardless of whether a choice is of major social significance, like the decision to 
build a large hydro dam, or as insignificant as the decision to save a chocolate bar for 
later, the choice is made on the basis of an evaluation of alternative futures and an 
ordering of them on a scale from better to worse. Thus, these alternative futures can 
be seen as "objects" to which people assign "value". Economics, then, attempts to 
identify the value assigned to objects, and express it in a form that allows a decision 
maker to compare the values of alternative futures and make a choice between 
them; thus, "[e]conomic measures of value are species of the genus assigned value, 
which belongs to the family value" (Brown, 1984, p.231; italics in the original). The 
discipline does not normally deal with value-as-criterion; these underlying 
preferences are usually taken as givens, assuming that individuals have their own 
reasons and motives for preferring one thing over another, and that they are the best 
judges of what is good for them. This notion is usually referred to as individual or 
consumer sovereignty. 
Economics does not provide a single, fully specified and comprehensive definition of 
total value (although the concept of option price is an initial move in this direction; 
see Bishop, 1987); rather, it operates with a number of concepts, reflecting 
behavioural observations, that describe components or incidents of value. Some of 
the more fundamental concepts are briefly introduced in Section 5.2, followed by an 
account of some specific measures of economic value in Section 5.3; for a more 
elaborate, and theoretically more precise treatment refer to any textbook on 
microeconomic theory, e.g. Mansfield (1979). 
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5.1 Philosophical foundations of economic theory 
Like other social and behavioural sciences, economics can be separated into a 
positive and a normative branch. The subject matter of positive economics is the 
description, explanation and prediction of the decisions that consumers and 
producers make about the allocation of resources. Positive economics deals with 
what is; thus, in terms of the typology of value theories presented in Section 3.1, it is 
a descriptive theory of value. Normative economics on the other hand deals with how 
resource allocation decisions ought to be made: with the criteria for judging 
alternative resource allocations and with the mechanisms for achieving them 
(Sassone, 1982). Normative economics looks at the use of resources, be they 
physical, human, financial or whatever, and the distribution of their benefits among 
people, and asks: "are some resource allocations better than others?" and "is there an 
optimal or best allocation?". Normative economics concerns itself with the 
well-being or welfare of the members of society; this is why it is frequently referred 
to as welfare economics. Because welfare economics inquires into what ought to be, 
rather than into what is, it is classified amongst the normative theories of value. 
To distinguish between "better" and "worse" resource allocations and thus rank 
alternative social states according to their social desirability, a social decision rule is 
needed. The choice of this social decision rule, the Social Welfare Function, involves 
some fundamental value judgements. In the first instance, welfare economics rests 
on two major assumptions: 
(a) individuals are the best judges of their own welfare; and 
(b) the welfare of society depends solely on the welfare of individuals. 
It is evident that these assumptions are based on value judgements; for example, by 
accepting assumption (b) one rejects the notion that a society is an "organism" that is 
greater than the "sum" of its members, and that has values of its own; moreover, 
anything not valued by any individual has eo ipso no value. 
Within this individualistic context, a number of further value judgements are 
necessary; the major themes here are efficiency and equity. 
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5.1.1 Efficiency 
The use of the term "efficiency" in economics derives from the Pareto rule which is 
one of the possible social decision rules. The Pareto rule, named after the Italian 
economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), declares that "[ ... ] state 1 is socially 
preferred to state 2 if no one prefers state 2 to state 1 and at least one person prefers 
state 1 to state 2" (c.f. Sassone, 1982, p.962). For example, a proposal to preserve a 
historic building is Pareto superior to the building's destruction, if no individual is 
made worse-off by implementing this proposal, and at least one person is made 
better off. If no Pareto improvement is possible because any change would make 
some people worse-off, then the situation is called Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal. 
Questions of distributional justice cannot be addressed by the Pareto criterion; if the 
initial distribution of welfare is deemed to be unjust (by whatever criterion), a 
Pareto superior (implying socially "better") state does not necessarily redress this 
injustice. The Pareto criterion thus contains an implicit value judgement about the 
appropriateness of the initial social state. Furthermore, the criterion is limited in 
that it does not provide any help in judging between the many possible Pareto 
efficient states. In practice, most social actions involve at least some negative 
impacts on some people; in such situations, the Pareto rule does not provide any 
guidance. 
A related form of a social decision rule is the potential Pareto rule, also known as the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion (named after Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks); according to 
this criterion a proposed change is socially preferred if the "winners" could 
compensate the "losers" and still be better-off. Note that there is no requirement for 
an actual compensation; hence the name potential Pareto rule. The implicit value 
judgement regarding the initial distribution of welfare is still present; however, 
another value judgement of the original Pareto rule, the right of everybody not to be 
made worse-off by a social decision, is reversed. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion is of 
great importance in modern welfare economics, because, in contrast to the original 
Pareto rule, it can be applied in real situations; Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) (see 
Section 5.3) is frequently used to provide the data for a Kaldor-Hicks test. 
Three other possible social decision rules may be mentioned briefly: 
(a) The unanimity rule, which states that a social state is superior if every single 
individual in society judges it to be preferable; the underlying value 
judgements are similar to those of the Pareto rule, and the practical 
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limitations of this criterion are self-evident; 
(b) majority rule; this rule states that a social state is superior if it is preferred by 
the majority of the members of that society. The rule is practically feasible 
and widely used for collective decisions. Here, the value judgements concern 
the rights of the minority against the majority; furthermore, it is deemed 
irrelevant whether the preferences for different social states are strong or 
weak: 50.1 % of the people with a weak preference for one social state 
prevail over 49.9 % of the people with a strong preference for the other. 
Because of this latter point, " ... few economists have been willing to embrace 
the principle" (Sassone, 1982); 
(c) The Bergson welfare function; this decision rule assigns different weights to 
individual preferences to achieve equitable outcomes; however, it assumes 
that the well-being of one person can be compared to the well-being of 
another - an assumption that is not widely held by economists. 
5.1.2 Equity 
A second area where normative questions in welfare economics are evident is equity. 
The main issues at stake include equality, justice, and liberty. A distinction made 
between outcome equity and process equity is important in this context. The former 
is concerned with the fairness or equality of the outcome of social actions, while the 
latter is interested in the equity of the initial distribution of welfare, and the 
processes of change in this distribution. 
Questions of outcome equity are mainly addressed in the form of teleological and 
formal de ontological value theories as discussed in Section 3.1. For example, the 
(teleological) decision rule of utilitarianism concentrates on total social welfare; the 
(formal deontological) decision rule in Rawlsian justice concentrates on the welfare 
of the least well-off member of society. Outcome equity is often addressed in terms 
of equality: the more equal the distribution of welfare, the "better" it is; this ethical 
principle is often referred to as egalitarianism (see e.g. Atkinson, 1970; Friedman & 
Friedman, 1980; Kneese, 1977; Tobin, 1970; Sen, 1973). Another approach to 
determining outcome equity is envy: an outcome is deemed to be fair if no individual 
is envious of the welfare of another member of society (see e.g. Baumol, 1986, and 
Feldman, 1980). 
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Questions of process equity often take the form of axiological or material 
deontological arguments; thus, it does not matter what the outcome in terms of 
social welfare is, as long as the process of achieving an outcome is fair. The most 
important criterion of process equity is the notion of equal opportunity: for example, 
it may be argued that it is unfair or unjust if some people are disadvantaged because 
of their age, gender, race, or even because of their genetic characteristics (see e.g. 
Nozick, 1974, and Sen, 1986). 
5.1.3 Individual and social values 
One further issue remains to be briefly raised: the question of the relation between 
individual and social welfare. Recall the two fundamental assumptions of welfare 
economics mentioned above: 
(a) individuals are the best judges of their own welfare; and 
(b) the welfare of society depends solely on the welfare of individuals. 
According to these assumptions, a Social Welfare Function is derived from individual 
welfare functions, Le. from people's underlying preferences. However, it is by no 
means clear /WW such a social decision rule is constructed from individual values. 
Indeed, Kenneth Arrow has shown in his famous "impossibility theorem" (Arrow, 
1963), that there is no way of obtaining a social welfare ordering from individual 
values that guarantees to satisfy a few fairly plausible conditions. These conditions 
can be stated as follows (c.f. McLean, 1987): 
(a) Universal domain: the social choice procedure can cope with every possible 
configuration of individual preferences (condition U); 
(b) The Pareto condition: if every individual in a society prefers x to y, the social 
choice procedure should pick x over y (condition P); 
(c) The Independence condition: the social ranking of any pair of options depends 
only on the individual rankings of that pair and is not affected by individual 
rankings of either member of the pair viS-A -vis others (condition I); 
(d) Non-dictatorship: there is no individual whose preferences always become 
society's irrespective of everyone else's preferences (condition D); 
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(e) Transitivity: the requirement that the social ordering be "rational"; i.e., if . 
society prefers A over B, and B over C, then it also prefers A over C. 
Arrow's theorem states, that if there are at least three people, and at least three 
options, no rational social welfare function can guarantee to satisfy conditions U, P, 
I, andD. 
Arrow's theorem has been pivotal in the development of modern social choice 
theory, integrating political theory with economics. The primary impact of Arrow's 
initial result was to demand a re-examination of the entire basis of social welfare 
judgements. There is a vast body of literature dealing with the impossibility theorem 
under varied conditions; in particular, the requirements of collective rationality, and 
the Independence condition have come under scrutiny. For an overview of Arrow's 
theorem and social choice theory, see Sen (1987); an excellent non-technical 
discussion can be found in McLean (1987). 
5.1.4 Utilitarianism 
Welfare economics has traditionally been dominated by an underlying utilitarian 
moral philosophy. Although welfare economics can be based on other normative 
ethical theories - and economists increasingly explore other normative foundations 
(see e.g. Baumol, 1986, and Sen, 1986, 1987) - the mainstream of modern welfare 
economics remains utilitarian. For this reason, the main elements of utilitarianism 
are briefly stated: 
(a) consequentialism: The rightness of actions - and (more generally) of the 
choice of all control variables - must be judged entirely by the goodness of the 
consequent state of affairs; 
(b) welfarism: The goodness of states of affairs must be judged entirely by the 
goodness of the set of individual utilities in the respective states of affairs; 
( c) sum-ranking: The goodness of any set of individual utilities must be judged 
entirely by their sum total (Sen, 1986, p.278). 
With these philosophical underpinnings of welfare economics in mind, the general 
as well as some specific economic concepts of value can be explored. 
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5.2 The general concept of value 
In a widely quoted passage in the Wealth of nations, Adam Smith wrote: 
''The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and 
sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the 
power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys. The 
one may be called 'value in use'; the other, 'value in exchange'" (Smith, 1776, 
p.21). 
This basic distinction, which can be traced as far back as Aristotle (Politica, 1257a6-14, 
c.f. Georgescu-Roegen, 1968), to this day provides the underpinning of the utility theory 
of value. 
5.2.1 Utility analysis 
The term utility, used by economists since the eighteenth century in close connection with 
their inquiry into the phenomenon of value, was originally used in the objective sense of 
"usefulness", referring to an inherent quality or property of an object to produce benefits, 
pleasure or happiness. Its meaning gradually shifted to the purely subjective concept of 
"desiredness", expressing a feeling of the mind. The classical economists had no theory 
to explain the relationships between utility, demand, and market prices, i.e. between value 
in use and value in exchange. Such an explanation rests on a distinction between total 
utility, and increments of utility, reflecting the common observation that the consumption 
of successive units of a good yields ever decreasing amounts of satisfaction; for example, 
to a very thirsty person, the first glass of water may taste like the best drink s/he has ever 
had; a second glass is still very satisfying, whilst the third tastes pretty ordinary, and a 
fourth is refused. Today, this is known as the Principle of Diminishing Marginal Utility. 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the attention of economists shifted 
from value in use, or total utility, to the analysis of incremental or marginal utility, thus 
enabling the development of a theory linking value in use with value in exchange; at the 
close of the century, Francis Edgeworth wrote: 
''The relation of utility to value, which exercised the older economists, is thus 
simply explained by the mathematical school. The value in use of a certain 
quantity of commodity corresponds to its total utility; the value in exchange to its 
marginal utility (multiplied by the quantity). The former is greater than the latter, 
since the utility of the final increment of commodity is less than that of every 
other increment" (Edgeworth, 1899, p.602, c.f. Black, 1987). 
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Economists frequently use diagrammatic representations to communicate formal 
concepts and relationships; thus the concepts of utility and marginal utility can be 
displayed in the following way (Fig. 5.1): 
u 
o Q 
Figure 5.1: Total and marginal utility. 
The vertical axis in Figure 5.1, labelled U, represents utility, increasing from the 
origin; the horizontal axis, labelled Q, measures the quantity of a commodity, again 
increasing from the origin. 
The curve U = f(Q) shows how utility varies with changing quantities of Q; the 
height of the curve at point A is the total utility derived from consuming Xl units of 
Q. 
The curve MU = U' = dU/dQ shows the amount of utility associated with each 
additional unit of Q. Mathematically, this is the first derivative of U = f(Q). Note 
that this marginal utility of consumption can become negative (at x2); for example, 
consuming more than the prescribed dosage of medication can have adverse health 
effects. 
There are two basic problems with the concept of utility: one is the measurement of 
utility, the other the interpersonal comparison or aggregation of utility. According 
to Georgescu-Roegen (1982, p.934), "[i]t was Plato who first claimed that what we 
now understand to mean utility has a measure". Many prominent economists, 
amongst them Bentham, Edgeworth, Walras and Marshall, believed that utility must 
be cardinally measurable, i.e., that there was a proper unit for utility, a "util", as it 
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were. Thus, Bentham coined the term "moral thermometer", and Edgeworth hoped 
for a "hedonimeter" to measure utility. Moreover, it was commonly assumed that 
these "utUs" could be added up across persons, thus providing a measure of the utility 
of a group of people, or society. However, the idea of measurable or cardinal utility 
has by now been largely abandoned. The modern concept of utility involves only 
ordinal comparison; i.e. different levels of utility are ordered from lower to higher, 
but it is meaningless to say that "level A is so much higher than level B". 
Furthermore, modern economics does not assume that the utility of person X can be 
added to, or subtracted from, the utility of person Y in any meaningful way. 
5.2.2 Indifference analysis and revealed preference 
Rather than attempting to measure utility in some kind of units, indifference analysis 
inquires whether a particular utility level associated with the consumption of a 
combination or bundle of several goods is higher or lower than others, or 
alternatively, which combinations of goods produce the same level of utility. 
This approach can be demonstrated by adding another dimension (or axis) to Figure 
5.1, representing a second good; a graphic representation would be a three-
dimensional picture of something akin to a mountain, where the horizontal 
dimensions represent the two goods, and the vertical axis represents utility; the 
surface of the mountain would then indicate the total utility derived from the 
consumption of any possible combination of both goods. 
Now, if one were to cut off the top of that mountain at a particular altitude (or utility 
level), a contour line would become apparent - very much like the contour lines on a 
topographical map; and in the same way as a contour line on a map shows all the 
places on a mountain that are at the same altitude, the contour lines of the "utility 
mountain" show all the combinations of two goods that produce the same total utility 
level (Fig. 5.2). 
Both axes or dimensions now represent quantities of goods, say bottles of wine, and 
casks of fruit juice. The contour lines on this "utility-map" show various 
combinations of the two goods that provide the consumer with the same amount of 
total utility, and thus leave her/him indifferent between them; hence their name 
indifference curves. For example, a consumer might be indifferent between the 
following pairs of goods: 
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10 bottles of wine and 1 cask of fruit juice, or 
6 bottles of wine and 3 casks of fruit juice, or 
3 bottles of wine and 6 casks of fruit juice, or 
1 bottle of wine and 10 casks of fruit juice. 
Casks 
of juice 
5 
o 
Figure 5.2: Indifference curves. 
Bottles 
of 
wine 
Every consumer is assumed to have a whole set of these indifference curves; under 
normal circumstances, the further away from the origin a curve is, the higher the 
utility level (the closer to the top of the mountain), since people usually prefer more 
of a good to less of it. For example, the points Band C are preferred to point A, 
since they involve more of one good, without having to give up some of the other. 
However, in the real world, resources are limited, and therefore, not all desirable 
combinations of goods are available to the consumer. The consumer is constrained 
by a budget, say $100, and the current prices at the liquor store stand at $10 each for 
wine and fruit juice; thus s/he can for example buy 10 bottles of wine and no juice, or 
10 casks of juice and no wine, or five of each. This constraint is introduced in Figure 
5.3 by the budget line BC. The consumer now has the choice between all 
combinations within the area OBC. 
Economics now assumes a certain kind of behaviour of consumers, i.e. that they 
choose that combination of goods that allows them to reach the highest indifference 
curve, so as to "maximise their utility". This is just another way of saying that 
"everybody does what they think is best at the time" (Boulding & Lundstedt, 1988, 
p.14). In Figure 5.3, this means that the combination of wine and juice at point A on 
indifference curve U' is chosen. 
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Assume now that for some reason the price of wine rises to $20 a bottle. This 
changes the budget line to BD, and the available combinations of wine and juice are 
constrained to the area OBD (Fig. 5.4). The previously optimal combination A is 
now no longer available. The best possible mix of wine and fruit juice is now point E 
on curve V", i.e. on a lower utility level than was previously attainable. 
Casks 
of B 
juice 
5 
Casks 
of B 
juice 
5 
Figure 5.3: Consumer clwice. 
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Figure 5.4: Effect of a price change. 
By varying the price of a good and observing the resulting effects, one can collect a 
number of price/quantity combinations for that good; in the present example, the 
consumer may choose to buy six bottles of wine at a price of $10, three bottles at $20, 
and none at $50. Plotting these combinations (Fig. 5.5) produces the consumer's 
demand curve for wine. The demand curve shows the different amounts that the 
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:onsumer is willing to pay for the first bottle of wine, for the second bottle of wine, 
or the third, and so on. 
Price 5 
of 
wine ($) 4 
3 
2 
1 
0 3 6 
Bottles 
of 
wine 
Figure 5.5: Demand curve for wine. 
Iowever, in order to derive a demand curve, a major difficulty must be overcome: in 
he example presented above, it was assumed that the indifference curves of the 
:onsumer were known; in the real world, this is hardly ever the case. Moreover, the 
'ery notion of "indifference" is problematic: true indifference requires that the states 
.f mind of an individual facing two different situations are absolutely identical 
Georgescu-Roegen, 1982). 
['his difficulty was resolved with the introduction of the theory of revealed preference 
.y Paul A. Samuelson. The central premise of the theory of revealed preference is 
he consistency-axiom: it states that "[i]f an individual chooses A as the optimal 
listribution of his or her budget when also B can be chosen, the same individual will 
lever choose B in any budget for which A is also available" (c.f. Georgescu-Roegen, 
982, p. 939). If people behave in a consistent manner with regard to their 
.references, then it becomes possible to derive the demand function from mere 
aarket data (i.e., by observing the quantities demanded at different prices); the 
onsumers' preferences are revealed by their behaviour in real choice situations. In 
:ontrast to utility and indifference analysis, revealed preference is an empirical 
:oncept, but it is based on indifference analysis. 
47 
5.2.3 Consumer surplus 
The final step to get from these notions to a concept of value (assigned value) is now 
very simple; consider Figure 5.6: 
Price 
of 
wine ($) 
o 3 6 
Figure 5.6: Consumer surplus. 
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The demand curve shows the maximum amount the consumer is prepared to pay for 
the nth bottle of wine, given that slhe has already consumed (or at least bought) n-l 
bottles; this is called the consumer's marginal willingness to pay for wine. Adding up 
the marginal willingness-to-pay for all the units produces the total willingness-to-pay 
for n bottles of wine; this is a measure of the total (gross) benefits the consumer 
expects from purchasing n bottles of wine. On the graph, this is the total area under 
the demand curve. 
In a competitive market, the individual consumer cannot influence the price at which 
a good is supplied; the individual is a price taker. This constant price for wine is 
represented by the supply curve S in Figure 5.6 (under perfect competition 
assumptions a straight horizontal line ), which is a measure of the cost the consumer 
expects to incur when buying wine. 
It is apparent now, that for every bottle of wine, the gross benefits are not equal to 
the expected costs; in fact, for the first few bottles, benefits exceed costs. The net 
benefits to the consumer are equal to the excess of gross benefits over costs; i.e. total 
willingness-to-pay minus total cost. This net benefit is the consumer's surplus, and it 
is represented in Figure 5.6 by the shaded area under the demand curve and above 
the supply curve. 
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Thus, consumer demand theory can be used to derive a measure of value (assigned 
value) in the form of consumer surplus and expressed in terms of willingness-to-pay. 
So far, the discussion has dealt with the individual consumer's value only; however, 
recalling the main tenets of the utilitarian ethic, social value or social welfare is 
derived by simply adding up the respective surpluses of all individual members of 
society. Note that the measure of value expressed in terms of willingness-to-pay is 
dependent on the initial distribution of welfare: while a good may be as valuable to a 
rich or a poor person (say, a bottle of water in the desert), the rich person will be 
able to pay more for it. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, welfare economics is concerned with 
the social choice between alternative proposals. The decision rule that utilitarian 
welfare economics applies most frequently is the Kaldor-Hicks criterion discussed in 
Section 5.1.1; i.e., a proposed change is socially preferred if the "winners" could 
compensate the "losers" and still be better off. To determine who wins or loses how 
much, and thus whether winners could potentially compensate losers, welfare 
economics makes use of four specific measures of value based on consumer surplus. 
5.2.4 Compensating and equivalent measures 
The four measures of value mentioned above are: 
(a) compensating variation 
(b) compensating surplus 
( c) equivalent variation 
(d) equivalent surplus. 
Assume that a government wants to induce consumers to drink less wine for health 
reasons; for that purpose, a "health tax" on wine is introduced, which raises the price 
of wine from $10 to $20. Referring to Figure 5.6, it can be seen that the consumer 
would now only buy three bottles of wine, rather than six as before. Moreover, the 
consumer would face a loss of utility, as hislher budget of $100 buys less wine than 
before. The compensating measures determine how much additional income the 
consumer would need to be given to be as well-off as before the price rise (but 
drinking less wine and more fruit juice). 
Conversely, equivalent measures determine how much the consumer would be 
willing to pay to the government in order not to have the price of wine raised. Thus, 
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compensating measures are based on the initial level of utility, while equivalent measures 
are based on the subsequent level. 
Surplus measures are used in cases where the consumer can adjust the quantities 
consumed - like in the case of wine. Variation measures are used in cases where the 
consumer cannot respond by changing the quantity, for example, when a government 
introduces a policy that alters the level of air pollution. In this case, the consumer has 
no choice (in the short term) but to endure (or enjoy) the change in pollution levels. (For 
a detailed discussion of the welfare-theoretical basis of these measures of value, and 
choice of the appropriate measure, see Devine, 1987.) 
5.3 Non-market valuation 
Not all goods and services are exchanged in markets; these goods are often natural 
resources like water, air, offshore fisheries, or they may be goods produced and provided 
by government like roads, national defence etc. Such goods are called public goods, in 
distinction from private goods. A pure public good is characterised by non-excludability, 
Le. everyone can use it and no-one can be excluded from the use of the good, and by 
flon-rivalry i.e. the use of the good by one person does not diminish the value of using it 
to another person. In contrast, private goods are able to confer benefits only to a single 
user who can exclude others from using the good. An example of a public good is TV-
transmissions: nobody can be prevented from receiving the TV signals, and the 
transmission quality of a programme does not (for practical purposes) deteriorate if many 
people watch it. An example of a private good is a pair of boots: only one person can 
use them at a time, and the owner of the boots can prevent other people from using 
them even if s/he does not wear them at the time. There is a broad spectrum of goods 
ranging from pure public goods to pure private goods with many types of goods 
combining aspects of both classes. 
However, the fact that a public good has no market price does not mean that it has no 
value to society. Choices about the provision of these goods still need to be made and, 
conceptually speaking, they need to be made on exactly the same basis of evaluating all 
alternative futures by determining the associated costs and benefits to all people. In the 
following section, some concepts of value used in non-market valuation are introduced, 
followed by an overview of the main methods for measuring non-market values. 
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5.3.1 Concepts of value in non-market valuation 
There are a number of specific concepts of value that are of importance in a 
non-market valuation context; these concepts are of comparatively recent origin, and 
so the definitions in the literature are not always consistent. The present description 
follows Kerr (1986) and Kerr & Sharp (1987). 
5.3.1.1 Use value 
This is the value derived from present and (expected) future use of the resource in 
any form whatsoever, be it commercial or non-commercial. Examples include 
National Park visits, attendance at public concerts, wildlife photography etc. 
5.3.1.2 Option value 
There may be uncertainty about the future demand or supply of a resource; in this 
case the expected use value must be adjusted to reflect people's attitudes towards 
that uncertainty. This adjustment is called option value, and can be compared to a 
kind of insurance premium that people are willing to pay in order to cover 
themselves against, or be exposed to, a risk. 
5.3.1.3 Quasi-option value 
This is the value of improved knowledge about outcomes of resource uses in 
instances where the proposed use of the resource results in irreversible changes (e.g. 
the logging of rain forests). The knowledge about positive or negative outcomes 
only becomes available in the future, hence its value cannot be estimated. If this 
knowledge of future states was available, it could be included directly in decision 
making; thus, "[w]hile quasi-option value is definable, it is useless for decision 
making" (Kerr & Sharp, 1987, p.95). 
5.3.1.4 Existence value 
This is the value associated with the mere knowledge that a resource exists or is 
preserved. Various motives have been suggested as elements of existence value 
(Brookshire et al., 1987): 
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(a) vicarious consumption, i.e. the individual's willingness-to-pay to know that 
others are using the resource; 
(b) bequest, i.e. the willingness-to-pay for the preservation of a resource so that 
children and grandchildren will be able to use it; 
(c) altruism, in the form of interpersonal altruism, intergenerational altruism, 
and in the form of knowing that the resource is undisturbed (Randall & Stoll, 
1983); 
(d) stewardship, I.e. a willingness-to-pay for preserving ecological diversity 
because this is part of the affairs of other individuals, or because the 
resources belong to future generations; 
(e) intrinsic value, i.e. willingness-to-pay for knowing that the resource is 
undisturbed for its own sake. 
These categories or elements of existence value are not consistently defined in the 
literature; the review by Brookshire et al. (1987) suggests considerable overlap. To 
some extent, these forms of consumption may be considered part of use and option 
value, insofar as they fall into the category of sympathy as defined by Sen: 
"When a person's sense of well-being is psychologically dependent on 
someone else's welfare, it is a case of sympathy; other things given, the 
awareness of the increase in the welfare of the other person then 
makes this person directly better off' (Sen, 1977, c.f. Brookshire et al., 
1987, p.15). 
However, it can also be argued that some of these motives are ,instances of a true 
counter-preferential choice; as such, they would fall into what Sen characterises as 
commitment: 
"One way to define commitment is in terms of a person choosing an 
act that he believes will yield a lower level of personal welfare to him 
than an alternative that is also available to him" (Sen, 1977, c.f. 
Brookshire et al., 1987, p. 15). 
This is an area where economics inquires into individual values in the sense of 
value-as-criterion: in order to be able to clearly conceptualize existence value, and 
assign its components into use and non-use, and preferential choice and 
counter-preferential choice categories, a better understanding of the motives that 
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underlie human behaviour is required. (For a review of conceptual and empirical 
work in existence and intrinsic values, see Brookshire et al., 1987, and Smith, 1987). 
5.3.2 Methods of value measurement 
Values can be estimated either directly by determining maximum willingness-to-pay 
(or minimum willingness-to-sell), or indirectly by determining demand curves and 
measuring consumer surplus. The only direct method is the contingent valuation 
method; all other methods are indirect. 
5.3.2.1 Contingent valuation 
The contingent valuation method is based on the simulation of a market for a 
non-market good. It uses standard survey research techniques (interviews and 
questionnaires) to estimate the consumer's valuation (i.e. willingness-to-pay) of a 
good. The method employs open and forced-choice questions, bidding games and 
ranking exercises. It is particularly useful for estimations of non-use values. As the 
contingent valuation method is based on testimonial evidence, it is subject to the 
same range of methodological problems as discussed in the section on empirical 
value research in the social and behavioural sciences (Section 4.3). The method 
depends to a greater degree than usual survey research on the cooperation of the 
respondent, as some people simply refuse to express their valuation of non-market 
goods in monetary terms (Sagoff, 1988). A recent New Zealand application of 
contingent valuation was a study of values associated with the proposed Kawarau 
Gorge hydro scheme (Kerr, 1985). For reviews of the method see Bishop & 
Heberlein (1987), Brookshire et al., (1987) and Cummings et al., (1986). 
5.3.2.2 Travel cost analysis 
Travel cost analysis is a method for estimating the demand for site or location-
specific resources (e.g. National Parks, skiing facilities etc.). It rests on the 
assumption that in order to consume the good, the consumer has to get there first, 
and thus incurs costs associated with travelling; these costs are the price that the 
consumer has to pay for the use of the resource. Everything else being equal, one 
can expect that the cost increases with the distance the consumer has to travel. By 
observing the number of visitors and their origin, usually by means of a 
questionnaire, one can derive the demand for the site as a function of the "price" for 
using it. The method has been widely applied in North America; recent New 
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Zealand studies include Harris & Meister (1981), and Kerr et al. (1986). For a 
review of the method see Kerr (1987). 
5.3.2.3 Indifference curve mapping 
It was mentioned in Section 5.2 that a weakness of indifference analysis was that 
indifference curves of consumers were generally unknown. However, these 
indifference curves can he derived by interviewing a subject; in such an interview, the 
respondent makes a series of (hypothetical) choices between combinations or 
bundles of goods. Plotting these choices produces indifference curves from which 
the demand function can be derived; however, this requires some strong 
assumptions, e.g. fixed expenditure on a single class of goods. The same provisos 
apply as discussed in Section 4.3.; the method is quite demanding of subjects, and 
interviews can be difficult; as a result, the method is not widely used. For a detailed 
discussion see Bennett (1987). 
5.3.2.4 Hedonic pricing 
Hedonic pricing makes use of the fact that the value that is attached to a good by a 
consumer usually depends on a whole range of characteristics or attributes of that 
good that satisfy different aspects of the consumer's underlying value structure. For 
example, a car has the characteristics of size, safety, design, status, fuel consumption 
etc.; the value of a house may depend on the location, number of rooms, size of the 
section etc. For many such goods, an extensive data base of market values is 
available (e.g. in the housing market). By comparing the prices of goods, say houses, 
one can use statistical means to derive an estimate of the consumer's valuation of a 
particular attribute of these goods. The hedonic pricing methods depends strongly 
on high quality data; statistical analysis of the data is fairly demanding. For a review 
of the method see Fisher (1987). 
5.3.2.5 Cost benefit analysis 
As indicated in the introduction to this section, decisions about the provision of 
goods and services are, conceptually speaking, based on an assessment of all costs 
and benefits associated with them. In order to do so, these costs and benefits, which 
are instances of assigned value, need to be brought together in a common analytical 
framework, independent of whether they are priced in markets, or revealed through 
non-market valuation techniques. 
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In simple terms, eBA is the assessment of all costs and benefits associated with a 
proposal, and the expression of them in one common denombiator to enable a 
comparison between proposals to be made. The common denominator is arbitrarily 
chosen: it can be any unit of measurement, whether this is chocolate bars, compact discs 
or kakapos; however, for convenience a monetary unit is usually chosen. Cost benefit 
analysis is not a social decision rule: eBA is an information system or data base to which 
social decision rules (such as the Kaldor-Hicks criterion) can be applied. (For a short 
introduction into concepts of eBA see e.g. Kerr & Odgers, 1987; inore extensive 
treatments are found in Just et al., 1982; Mishan, 1982; Pearce, 1983.) 
An important element of any overall assessment of assigned values that are associated 
with particular decision alternatives is the use of a discounting procedure i.e. of a 
mechanism that relates valued events or objects occurring at different points in time to 
each other .. The principle of discounting is a reflection of the common observation that 
most people, for example, seem to prefer a bottle of wine now to a bottle of wine in a 
year. The underlying rationale of discounting behaviour can be seen in the fundamental 
'Jncertainty surrounding future events: if it is uncertain whether the benefits associated 
with a future event will actually materialise, then it seems reasonable to assign a lower 
value to that future, uncertain event, compared with the same event happening now with 
:ertainty. Thus, the inter-temporal evaluation of events operates with a time preference 
:is value-as-criterion. 
[n practice, discounting of future (expected) value is often performed by means of a 
iingle discount rate, say, five percent per annum. Note that a discount rate of zero 
?ercent does not imply the absence of time preference in principle; it is merely a special 
;ase of time preference, expressing indifference between present and future events. The 
lse of a single discount rate is based on two assumptions about the consistency of 
)ehaviour: firstly, that the same time preference (value-as-criterion) applies to all objects, 
)r classes of objects, of inter-temporal evaluation, and secondly, that the time preference 
~unction has a particular shape i.e. a steadily decreasing rate. Both of these two 
;onsistency assumptions can be challenged on empirical grounds, but it is unclear which 
lssumptions could possibly replace them (see e.g. Elster, 1985; Just et al, 1982 and 
Viishan, 1982). 
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5.4 Summary 
The normative foundation of mainstream welfare economics is provided by 
ultilitarianism with the main elements of consequentialism, welfarism, and 
sum-ranking. Other normative assumptions are possible and are increasingly 
explored by economists. Welfare economics uses the concept of total willingness-to-
pay as a measure of social value and the Kaldor-Hicks test as a social decision rule. 
To estimate the value of goods and services that are not exchanged in markets, 
specific non-market valuation methods are used. 
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Section Six 
Conclusions 
This study into the use of value concepts in various disciplines has revealed a wide 
range of contexts in which value phenomena are investigated. It has also established 
some theoretical cross-connections between these disciplines. 
The theoretical foundations for all value research can be found in philosophy, in 
normative as well as in meta-normative work. Philosophy inquires into the 
fundamental nature of value and valuation. The main themes that are apparent here 
are: 
(a) what is value? Is value an independent, physical or meta-physical property of 
objects, or does value arise out of an interaction between an object and a 
valuing subject? 
(b) what specific types of value can be identified? 
(c) what is the nature of a normative theory? Does a normative or ethical theory 
constitute some kind of knowledge that can be true or false, or is an ethical 
theory simply a personal statement? 
(d) what ethical rules should people observe in interacting with each other? 
(e) what ethical rules should people observe in interacting with nature? 
On the basis of particular answers to these philosophical questions, social and 
behavioural scientists inquire into the values and attitudes that are held by people 
and groups of people. The main themes in this connection are: 
(a) what is the psychological and social nature of values and value systems? 
(b) how do values develop, and what are the main influences shaping this 
development? 
( c) what is the relation between values, attitudes and behaviour? 
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(d) what metiwds are available to reveal and describe values and value systems? 
Finally, economics inquires into the process and the outcomes of individual and 
social choice by observing, describing and predicting the value that people assign to 
objects and experiences. On the basis of particular normative ethical theories, 
welfare economics investigates socially desirable choices. Here, the main themes 
are: 
(a) what are the main characteristics and components of assigned value? 
(b) what are the distinguishing features of the objects and experiences to which 
people attach value? 
(c) which metiwds can be used to reveal the values that people place on objects 
and experiences? 
(d) how can individual values be combined into social values? 
(e) which decision rules can be used to make social choices? 
Several implications for the Ministry'S research programme on values arise from this 
study. 
(a) The question whether "value" is to be interpreted in an objectivist or a 
subjectivist manner needs to be resolved, as this has obvious implications for 
the direction of future research. An objectivist interpretation of expressions 
such as "the intrinsic value of ecosystems" would appear to demand further 
research efforts in the area of philosophy and meta-physics. Two main areas 
would require exploration: (1) the nature of the objects that are carriers of 
value ("what is an ecosystem; what are the boundaries of an ecosystem; how 
do we distinguish between higher and lower order systems?"); this is a 
problem of ontology. (2) the processes by which the value of these objects is 
revealed; this is a problem of epistemology. 
A subjectivist interpretation on the other hand would appear to require 
further research efforts in the social sciences and in economics, directed at 
the values and value systems held by people and groups of people (for 
example with regards to ecosystems), and at the characteristics or features of 
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objects like ecosystems that give rise to a value experience in people. Since 
values and value systems may change over time, a subjectivist interpretation 
of value implies an ongoing research effort. 
(b) In all three of the disciplinary areas that were explored in this study, value 
research with particular reference to environmental or resource management 
issues is of comparatively recent origin. As a result of this, the concepts and 
definitions within each discipline vary significantly; furthermore, as far as 
economics and the social and behavioural sciences are concerned, there is so 
far only a comparatively small body of empirical work available. Some areas 
that appear to be worthy of particular attention are: 
in philosophy: the exploration of alternative ethical systems that focus on the 
relationship between people and their environment; the exploration of the 
moral relationship between the present world and future worlds; and the 
exploration of the philosophical implications of contemporary physics. 
in economics: the discussion of alternative normative foundations for welfare 
economics; the conceptual and empirical exploration of non-use values such 
as "existence values"; and the development of a substantial body of empirical 
work on non-market values of natural resources. 
in the social and behavioural sciences: the exploration of the influence of 
values and attitudes on behaviour with respect to the physical environment; 
the exploration of methods to influence environmental attitudes and 
behaviour; and the development of a substantial body of empirical work on 
the values and attitudes that people and groups of people hold towards the 
quality of the environment in general, as well as towards particular aspects of 
the environment. 
(c) Finally, as indicated in the Ministry'S Research Agenda 1989-1992 in Theme 
13, Topics 36 and 45, institutional frameworks need to be developed for the 
integration of value information with other physical, social and economic 
data. 
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